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Governance, Ownership Structure and Performance of IPO Firms:   
The Impact of Different Types of Private Equity Investors and  
Institutional Environments  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper examines performance effects of ownership concentration and two types of private 
equity investors (venture capitalists and business angels) in firms that have recently 
undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in the United Kingdom and France.  We expand 
and contextualize nascent understanding of multiple agency theory by examining 
heterogeneity of private equity investors and by suggesting that multiple agency relationships 
are affected by different institutional contexts. We employ a unique, hand-collected dataset of 
224 matched IPOs (112 in each country). Controlling for the endogeneity of private equity 
investors’ retained share ownership, we find support for the agency theory argument that 
concentrated ownership improves IPO’s performance.  The research also shows that the two 
types of private equity investors have a differential impact on performance, and the legal 
institutions in a given country moderate this impact.   
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A growing body of corporate governance research has examined the relationships 
between stock ownership patterns, managerial behavior, and corporate performance. Despite 
theoretical attractions, research on the relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance is, at best, mixed (Dalton et al., 2003). In part, this research is limited by its 
focus on the effects of large-block share ownership in large mature firms with relatively little 
attention to entrepreneurial firms that underwent an initial public offering (IPO).  Additionally, 
prior research is limited as it has not differentiated among types of investors. Recent studies 
on “conflicting voices” in strategic management have acknowledged that owner identity has 
important organizational implications as different owners may have different objectives and 
decision-making horizons (Hoskisson et al., 2002), but these studies are focused on public 
rather than private equity investors.   In private firms undergoing an IPO the major different 
private equity investors will have different agency relationships that will generate a multiple 
agency setting that has yet to be recognized widely (Arthurs et al., 2008).  Finally, previous 
studies on the impact of ownership patterns have focused almost solely on a single 
institutional setting, North America. But the institutional setting in which research is 
conducted may impact the nature and extent of agency conflicts and the governance roles of 
ownership patterns. This research will seek to overcome these shortcomings by examining the 
impact of ownership concentration and the presence of different block holders on IPO firm 
performance outside North America in different institutional settings. 
Examination of IPO firms offers potential for more insightful analysis of corporate 
governance effects since corporate governance of the firm at listing is likely clearer than at 
any point in the firm’s history (Filatotchev and Wright, 2005). Recognition of this fact has led 
Betty and Zajac (1994:315) to argue that “studying IPO firms may provide a particularly clear 
test of the agency-based contingency perspectives.”  IPO firms are characterized by different 
large-block holders of retained equity after listing. For example, while original founders are 
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often the largest shareholders in an IPO, there is also typically a heterogeneous set of outside 
private equity investors who specialize in high growth high potential ventures.  Specifically, 
two distinct types of private equity investors are present in an IPO, “formal” (venture 
capitalists or VCs) and “informal” (business angels or BAs) early-stage investors, with 
different investment objectives and time-horizons (Mason and Stark, 2004).  However, prior 
research on governance has ignored potential differences between VCs and BAs. As Gompers 
and Lerner (2001: 146) indicate: “our understanding of … ‘angel’ investing is highly 
incomplete.”    
Prior research on VC-backed IPOs had focused almost totally on the US market.   One 
cannot assume, however, that theories developed in the US, and associated empirical evidence, 
apply universally in other institutional settings.  Prior studies that combine agency research 
with institutional theory have shown that differences in national institutions can impact the 
effectiveness of corporate governance on the firm level (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; La Porta 
et al. 2000). For example, in common law societies, investors are willing to take more risks 
and use “arms-length” control mechanisms since they have legal remedies like the ability to 
sue in the courts if board members and managers do not act in their best interest and 
maximize firm profitability. In civil law countries investors rely more heavily on network-
based, “relationship” governance (Hoskisson, et al., 2004). Thus, the impact of various types 
of investors may be different in civil law environments, where fewer legal remedies are 
available compared to common law countries (Fiss and Zajac, 2004).  
This study, therefore, provides theoretical and empirical insights into the impact of 
concentrated ownership, types of block-holders, and their effects on IPO performance in two 
mature markets outside North America with different institutional settings. Specifically, we 
examine the contrasting contexts of the United Kingdom (UK), as a common law country, and 
France as a civil law country. The two countries differ in important ways that lead us to 
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expect differences in the performance of private-equity-backed firms following IPO. 
Ownership concentration in France is generally greater than in the UK.  UK BA and VC 
markets are significantly more developed and larger than French markets (EVCA, 2008). The 
value of VC investments in the UK in 2007 was equivalent to 1.69% of GDP compared with 
only 0.66% in France. VCs in France are less likely both to be independent and to monitor 
investees than their UK counterparts (Sapienza, Manigart, and Vermeir, 1996). BAs in the 
UK are more likely to form networks, with BA networks in the UK representing 36% of all 
European BA networks (Aernoudt, et al. 2007). Contrasting these two European IPO and 
venture capital markets offers the potential to control for many other extraneous variables that 
may confound findings while examining the moderating effects of the legal institutions on 
inter-relationships between ownership concentration, types of private equity block-holders, 
and resulting firm performance.  
This examination allows us to expand and contextualize nascent understanding of the 
multiple agency perspective (e.g., Arthurs et al., 2008) which moves away from a simplistic 
principal-agent dichotomy and considers multiple governance roles of the same participants in 
the firm’s governance mechanism.  First, we develop theoretical insight on this perspective by 
differentiating between formal and informal “pressure resistant” private equity investors in 
IPOs. Prior research has typically focused only on VCs and has provided mixed results on the 
relationship between the role of VCs and IPO stock market performance (cf. Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991; Barry et al., 1990; Gompers, 1996; Lee and Wahal, 2004). Examination of both 
VCs and BAs is important since the different objectives, funding sources, and time-horizons 
of BAs give rise to different agency problems and involvement with their investees than VCs, 
which may result in different performance consequences for IPO firms during and after 
flotation.  
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Second, we develop multiple agency theory by suggesting and showing that these 
multiple agency relationships are affected by different institutional contexts. Specifically, 
performance outcomes of ownership concentration and retained ownership by the two types 
of private equity investors may differ depending on the legal system and institutional 
characteristics of the private equity industry in a specific country. This is an important 
contribution as multiple agency theory research has so far tended to imply that it is a universal 
theory that applies in the same way in different institutional settings.  As such, we contribute 
to emerging attempts to integrate institutional and corporate governance research (e.g., 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) by combining institutional and multiple agency theories as we 
examine factors affecting performance of IPO firms.  
The paper employs a unique, hand-collected sample of 224 matched IPOs in the two 
countries during the period of 1996-2002 and controls for possible endogeneity of private 
equity firms’ ownership.  Prior research has too often not controlled for such endogeneity and 
thus this research method may serve as a model to others in the future. The empirical results 
refer primarily to market performance, but we also used an operating performance variable 
(return on assets, RoA) as a robustness test of the findings of the main study.   
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & HYPOTHESES 
An IPO often represents the first “liquidity event” in the life-cycle of a fast-growing 
firm when its founders and initial investors begin the process of realizing the value of their 
ownership stake in the firm (Brav and Gompers, 2003). However, the IPO process presents a 
number of potential agency conflicts for the various parties.  For example, a potential adverse 
selection problem exists since managers may not accurately reveal all they know about a firm.  
Since many firms at IPO have little operating history, investors cannot rely upon an extensive 
track record of performance to judge a firm’s health and potential for growth (Brav and 
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Gompers, 2003; Mason and Stark, 2004). By making overly optimistic estimates of the firm’s 
revenues the managers may try to inflate the expected value of the firm, which in turn 
increases their rewards from the IPO.   
In addition, IPO firms have a number of early stage investors that retain their 
ownership after the flotation whose objectives and incentives may not align with public 
market investors. The multiple agency framework suggests a complex picture of the 
governance roles of these early stage investors.  For example, although VCs are principals to 
a focal IPO firm, they are also agents to those who provide their investment funds (Arthurs et 
al., 2008). Founder-managers may hold significant equity stakes in the IPO firm, and there is 
the potential for these individuals to abuse public market investors (Sanders and Boivie, 2004). 
These dual roles can result in the traditional principal-agent problems in IPO firms being 
supplanted by multiple agency problems arising from principal-principal goal incongruence 
which occurs when a dominant owner disregards the interests of minority public market 
owners (Dharwadkar, George, and Brandes, 2000; Douma, George, and Kabir, 2006; Young, 
et. al., 2008). 
Being aware of the risks of these agency conflicts, public market investors will price-
protect themselves, leading to lower IPO valuations. A significant body of research in finance 
and management has developed various proxies for the “IPO discount,” including a reduction 
in the IPO’s offer price, an increase in “underpricing”, i.e. the difference between the offer 
and after-market prices among others (Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008).  As a result, scholars 
have sought to understand the means to control such IPO discounts. Following a pioneering 
paper by Leland and Pyle (1977), a growing body of research has examined potential signals 
that could be used by IPO firms to convey their value to investors and which are costly to 
imitate for low-quality firms with acute agency problems (Certo, 2003). We focus on the 
retained ownership patterns of IPO firms since “one of the key decisions private firm owners 
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and managers control at IPO is the percentage of the firm to sell” (Nelson, 2003: 714). We 
argue that ownership concentration and retained ownership by private equity investors 
represent important factors that can reduce or amplify risks outlined above and as a 
consequence can affect the performance of the IPO firm.  
Moreover, we argue that the direct effects of these agency risks on performance are 
contingent on the nature of the private equity investor and on the institutional environment in 
a particular country. First, the heterogeneity of private equity investors, specifically whether 
they are a formal VC or an informal BA, may impact the inter-relationship between 
ownership and performance. These different types of investors may have different 
implications in terms of certification of investee quality and their ability to deal with potential 
agency problems. Second, the extent to which a specific national context protects minority 
investors and legally enforces contracts will moderate the effects of ownership patterns. The 
following sections extend these arguments and develop appropriate hypotheses. 
Institutional environment, ownership concentration and IPO performance 
Agency theorists have long considered ownership concentration and types of block-
holders as governance factors that may reduce agency costs associated with diffuse ownership 
patterns (Barry et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Prior research argues that greater 
concentration of cash flow rights constrains the consumption of perquisites and thus produces 
a positive effect on corporate valuation as managers and directors operate in the interests of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
In the context of IPOs, the multiple agency framework suggests that high 
concentration of retained ownership may be a particularly important governance mechanism 
that mitigates the various types of agency conflicts identified earlier. First, large blocks of 
retained shares by early-stage investors may be a signal that reduces the risk of public market 
investors suffering from adverse selection (Leland and Pyle, 1977). The IPO is characterized 
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by lock-up arrangements that make retained ownership by original investors relatively illiquid 
after the IPO and as a result their retained concentrated ownership imposes a cost on those 
investors.  Thus, their retained ownership signals their belief in the value of the firm to 
minority investors (Field and Hanka, 2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003). Second, concentrated 
ownership leads to a reduction of coordination costs related to multiple types of private and 
public equity investors in the IPO firm. Dharwadkar et al. (2000:658) argue that high 
ownership concentration allows lower coordination costs, “because there are fewer owners 
with whom to coordinate”. Third, ownership concentration creates incentive alignment 
between public market and early stage investors that perform multiple principal-agent roles by 
shifting their preferences towards shareholder objectives, in line with arguments suggested by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Therefore, ownership concentration may be a particularly 
important governance parameter that enhances IPO firm performance and reduces the negative 
effects of the “IPO discount” arising from agency conflicts identified above.  Hence: 
Hypothesis 1a. IPO firm performance is positively associated with concentration of 
retained ownership. 
However, building on pioneering work within the law and economics field, 
management researchers increasingly argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms may differ from country to country and are moderated by institutional 
characteristics of a particular economic system (Dharwakar et al., 2000; Douma et al., 2006; 
Hoskisson et al., 2004). Therefore, the traditional agency framework may present only a 
partial view of the world and organization research would benefit from merging agency and 
institutional theories (Douma et al., 2006: 638). It follows, therefore, that the salience of 
agency problems discussed above and the effectiveness of corporate governance factors 
depends on national institutional environments. 
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Two principal strains of institutional theory shape research today, one from political 
science and economics (e.g., North, 1990), while another major branch of institutional theory 
comes primarily from sociology and organization theory (e.g., Scott, 2002).  The political 
science and economics approach assumes that the strategic actions taken by managers and 
organizations are the result of a strategic “calculus” to foster gains from exchange.  Thus, the 
theory focuses on the rules associated with political and economic institutions that create 
incentives for managers—given their preferences and cognitive abilities—and how these 
shape collective organizational outcomes (North, 1990).  The sociology/organization theory 
branch of institutional theory, alternatively, emphasizes how organizations adjust to pressures 
for legitimacy in the institutional environment.  
Our concern here is with those legal institutions that help form “the rules of the game 
in a society” (North, 1990).   Legal institutions can vary significantly even in different nations 
sharing similar cultural traits and even being close physically to each other (Wright et al., 
2005). The roots of the differences in legal institutions emanate from the distinction between 
two major families of legal systems, common law and civil law.  Common law systems build 
on the legal precedent established by judges as they resolve individual cases; those case 
opinions have the force of law and strongly influence future decisions.1  We extend these 
arguments by suggesting that the institutional context in which corporate governance factors 
operate may affect their impact as a signal to potential investors. Research examining the 
impacts of common and civil law on business has shown significant differences in voting 
rights attached to shares, protection of shareholder voting mechanisms against abuse by 
management, and remedial rights of minority shareholders in different nations.   
Common-law countries have the strongest legal protection of minority shareholders, 
while investor protection is weakest in French civil-law countries (Hoskisson et al., 2004; 
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Lerner and Schoar, 2005). For example, the composite investors’ protection index developed 
by La Porta et al. (2000) scores the UK at 5 but only 3 for France. Using a different 
methodology, the World Bank has developed a number of corporate governance indices, 
including an Ease of Shareholder Suits Index, which measures shareholders’ ability to sue 
officers and directors for misconduct and a Strength of Investor Protection Index (World 
Bank, 2008). According to these estimates, the Ease of Shareholder Suits and Strength of 
Investor protection indices are 7.0 and 8.0 in the UK, yet only 5.0 and 5.3 in France.  
Building on this research, we expect that, other things being equal, block-holders in 
common law nations such as the UK will need a relatively lower level of ownership 
concentration to signal their ability to deal with agency conflicts in firms going public since 
IPO investors have the ability to defer to legal protection of minority shareholders or to 
develop contractual arrangements if necessary to mitigate principal-agent and principal-
principal conflicts (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). In contrast, in settings with weak legal 
protection of minority shareholders, ownership concentration may be even more important as 
a governance mechanism. Bearing in mind that ownership concentration may affect after-
market liquidity, better protected public market investors in UK IPOs would prefer less 
concentrated ownership compared to investors in France. These arguments suggest that, other 
things being equal, one can expect opposite signaling effects of ownership concentration in 
the two institutional environments. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1b:   Compared to French IPOs, UK IPOs will show a negative 
relationship between performance and the concentration of retained ownership 
Private equity investors in IPO firms 
Ownership concentration may represent a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
mitigating agency conflicts arising within the IPO firm. For example, IPO signaling may 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 Common law originated in medieval England and spread to its colonies such as the United States, Hong Kong, 
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require the support of reputational considerations (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). Insiders with 
highly concentrated ownership have everything to gain and very little to lose from signaling 
falsely at the time of IPO. Therefore, investors are more likely to be convinced that accurate 
information disclosure has occurred only when concentrated investors with reputational 
capital at stake are present to “certify” the quality of the IPO firm. Private equity investors, 
such as VCs, are large-block shareholders that have the reputational capital to mitigate 
underpricing (Barry, et. al., 1990). In addition, VCs’ monitoring abilities are able to mitigate 
the potential agency problems discussed above (Florin, and Simsek, 2007).  These factors 
have led to the belief that VC presence will diminish IPO underpricing (Barry et al., 1990; 
Brav and Gompers, 2003; Megginson and Weiss, 1991). However, “grandstanding” research 
(Gompers, 1996; Gompers and Lerner, 1997; 2001; Lee and Wahal, 2004) contradicts these 
results and suggests that VCs accept greater underpricing as their main focus is to improve 
their profile and raise more funds from investors. These contradictory studies consider only 
formal VCs and do not theorize or control for other types of private equity investors. An 
explicit consideration of different types of private equity investors may contribute towards 
explaining these different findings.   
Two major types of private equity investors are typically involved in the governance 
of high growth high potential ventures which typify IPOs – VCs and BAs.  Jensen (1993) has 
held up such private equity investors as models for governance in the modern corporation 
since their ownership stakes and self interest ensure that they make the tough decisions to 
maximize profitability. Traditional agency theory has under-theorized the complexity of the 
role of such private equity block holders in the context of both multiple principals and 
multiple agents in the firm (Arthurs et al., 2008) and in different institutional environments 
(Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005).  While VCs and BAs are both private 
                                                                                                                                                        
Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and India. 
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equity investors, there are substantial differences in their nature that, in turn, may differentiate 
their impact on agency problems (Osnabrugge, 2000).  These differential impacts are partly a 
consequence of differences in their perception of agency risk (Fiet, 1995), which, in turn, 
leads to differences in the mechanisms adopted by VCs and BAs to address agency issues 
(Osnabrugge, 2000; Prowse, 1998). VCs are more concerned with market risk whereas BAs 
are more concerned with agency risks (Fiet, 1995; Mason and Stark, 2004). VCs rely on more 
formal contractual mechanisms of monitoring and control (Lerner, 1994) while BAs are more 
reliant on relational governance (Ehrlich, et al., 1994), and they invest on the basis of trust of 
the entrepreneur (Fiet, 1995).   
In addition, VCs have conflicting objectives due to their dual identity as both 
principals and agents (Arthurs et al., 2008).  As agents to their own investors, the VCs have 
both short-term pressures to obtain results with a timely exit from their investment while also 
facing long-term pressures for reputation building in order to raise future funds (Arthurs, et al., 
2008).  In contrast, BAs are patient investors (Madill et al., 2005; Sohl, 1999; Wetzel, 1983); 
using their own money, they are not constrained to exit within a limited, pre-defined period 
unlike VCs.  Thus, BAs are their own principals. These differences between VCs and BAs 
point to their potential differential impact on the various agency conflicts outlined above. 
Facing pressure from funds providers, VCs likely place more emphasis on signaling to 
investors that they are controlling agency costs ex ante through appropriate screening 
procedures and contracts. BAs more likely emphasize ex post control of agency costs through 
closer active relationships and monitoring (Osnabrugge, 2000).  We examine these 
differences, impact of institutional settings, and resulting IPO performance below. 
VCs, institutions and IPO performance 
VCs are more widely recognized and researched than are BAs. VCs typically are 
either the general partners of a limited partnership or employees of a bank or other financial 
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institution whose specialty is in directing the respective group’s investments in new ventures.  
There have been limited efforts to understand the post-IPO impact of VC ownership on the 
IPO firm.  Barry et al. (1990) show the effects of retained VC ownership and board presence 
following an IPO but do not consider the relationship with post-IPO performance. Similarly, 
Jain and Kini (1995) argue that VC backing may provide effective monitoring after an IPO, 
but their research does not discuss in detail the governance impact of the retained VC 
ownership or consider the institutional setting outside the US. Theorizing on post IPO 
monitoring by the VC, it is problematic to believe that the VC would be extensively involved 
in such monitoring of the firm.  While lock-up arrangements associated with the VC ensure 
they remain involved in the firm after its IPO, the lock-up period has a clear short and finite 
time horizon (Arthurs et al., 2009). In our sample, the mean lock-up period was a little over 
one year (12.26 months, see Table 1 below). The VC has strong motivations to exit the 
investment in order to redeploy its assets elsewhere, to distribute assets to the limited partner 
investors, and to establish an exit track record in order to raise further funds (Gompers 1996; 
Brav and Gompers, 2003). Active monitoring by VCs may increase their opportunity costs 
after flotation of their portfolio firms, which can limit VCs’ efforts to redeploy their assets to 
new investments.  Thus, active monitoring by the VC of their post IPO firm would seem to be 
limited, which in turn would indicate VC ownership will not lead to greater post-IPO 
performance.  The multiple agency perspective would argue that the impact of VCs’ retained 
ownership on IPO performance should be negative since VCs’ greater agency role towards 
their institutional investors reduces their willingness to put pressure on underwriters or protect 
the longer-term interests of the IPO firm by monitoring it on behalf of the more diffuse body 
of shareholders introduced during the IPO (Arthurs et al., 2008).  
In addition, Arthurs et al. (2008) argue that, to maintain their reputation with 
underwriters VCs need to signal that they are not walking away from poor or uncertain 
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performers. Underwriters may require the retention of larger equity stakes with associated 
lock-ups by VCs in businesses where poor performance by the venture exists (Lee and Wahal, 
2004). However, retained ownership by VCs may not mitigate the potential of agency 
problems since they do not focus on monitoring the firm after the IPO which can lead to a 
negative impact of their retained ownership on performance. Hence: 
Hypothesis 2a. IPO firm performance is negatively associated with retained 
ownership of venture capitalists. 
An institutional perspective, however, suggests a more complex story on the 
governance roles of VCs in different institutional settings (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; 
Bruton, Fried, and Manigart, 2005). Comparative studies have documented that VCs in 
countries with a common law tradition more likely use convertible preferred stock that shifts 
control rights to investors depending on the performance of the venture (Mayer, Schoors, 
Yafeh, 2005; Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Cummings, 2006), and other contractual arrangements 
such as liquidation preferences, anti-dilution protections, vesting provisions, and redemption 
rights (Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg, 2007). These contractual arrangements enhance the 
governance roles of VCs in common law countries compared to civil law countries. Evidence 
also shows significantly greater VC monitoring of investments in the UK than in France 
(Sapienza, et al., 1996).  
International comparisons indicate that reputational incentives of VCs are relatively 
higher in common law countries. In common law countries, venture capital firms as a rule are 
independent institutions, and their main sources of finance include pension funds, insurance 
companies, and other institutional investors (Kaplan et al., 2007). In civil law countries with 
bank-centered governance systems, such as France, VCs tend to be subsidiaries of banks and 
other financial institutions (so-called captives) who provide them with both equity and debt 
finance to make investments (Mayer et al., 2005).  
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Focusing on the rationale of Arthurs et al. (2008), we argue that the extent of the 
multiple agency associated with the VCs at the time of IPO could be different in the UK 
compared to France. VCs in France are, as a rule, captive firms, so the salience of the multiple 
agency conflict in this country is likely to be higher than in the UK. Remuneration in 
independent VCs usually aligns more closely with interests of fund investors than does 
remuneration for captive VCs. Captive VCs may also have shorter monitoring horizons since 
parent firms more likely assess them on annual return on capital while independent VCs are 
more likely to be assessed on the internal rate of return over the funds’ life (Robbie, Wright 
and Chiplin, 1997). These factors combined may further limit the certification and monitoring 
abilities of VCs in France compared to the UK.  Thus, while VCs’ retained ownership 
generally has a negative effect on IPO performance, their impact may be relatively different 
in common law countries compared to civil law countries. Hence: 
Hypothesis 2b:    Compared to French IPOs, UK IPOs will show a positive 
relationship between performance and VC retained ownership 
Business angels, institutions and IPO performance 
Although BAs represent another important type of block-holders in an IPO firm, 
considerably less is known about their governance roles compared to VCs (Lerner, 1998; Sohl, 
1999).  BAs are wealthy, successful individuals who, in contrast to VCs, are longer-term 
investors and are their own principals.  As such, BAs face less need to sell their shares, are 
likely to be more committed over the long term to the venture, and more likely engage in ex 
post monitoring activities (Osnabrugge, 2000).  While in general the BA market may lack 
transparency and BAs may be less concerned about their reputation than VCs, IPO reputation 
of the BA becomes increasingly important. As successful business people, BAs indicate to 
other investors the presence of a substantial investment and are often actively pursued by 
entrepreneurs (Aernoudt, San Jose, and Roure, 2007).  BAs will want to maintain and build 
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their reputation and networks so that they will be approached to make investments in other 
ventures as serial angels. As a result, they will need to actively monitor the firm and help 
ensure its success. Thus, one can expect BAs to utilize their longer-term commitment and 
trust relationship to influence management and ensure the performance of the venture (Politis, 
2008).  Higher retained ownership by BAs signals they believe that maintaining their 
investment is worthwhile since they will be incurring monitoring costs. Thus, BA retained 
ownership should more actively mitigate the extent of agency problems and it positively 
affects IPO performance. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3a. IPO firm performance is positively associated with retained 
ownership of business angels 
The above arguments, however, do not take into account potential institutional 
influences on the effectiveness of BA governance. BAs’ flexibility and longer time horizon 
are well suited to countries with a less formal institutional framework and less legal protection 
of minority shareholders. The BA also works with the investee more closely and over a longer 
term seeks to solve problems that arise, which is consistent with the civil law setting in France.  
If there is a problem to solve, the parties may be able to work it out over a longer time, 
whereas, with a shorter time horizon, the VC must often rely on legal means to reach a 
solution. Moreover, the preference for BAs to invest in closer geographic areas than do VCs 
makes relational monitoring easier (Sohl, 1999) and fits well in a geographically diverse 
country such as France in contrast to a geographically homogeneous UK (Chantelot, 2004).2 
In addition, other significant institutional differences between the UK and France lead 
to potential differences in angels’ effects on the IPO value in the two countries.  In the UK, 
                                                 
2 Chantelot (2004) examines the innovative industries in France and shows that French regions have developed 
some industrial clustering such as micro-electronic components in Bouches du Rhône, petrochemical in Haute 
Normandie, nuclear energy in Basse Normandie, chemical and nanotechnology in Rhone-Alpes, etc. Chantelot 
(2004: 10) also argues that public policy choices have contributed to the cluster of French industries such as the 
aeronautic industry in Toulouse. 
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BAs organize through the development of BA networks that have gradually evolved into 
knowledge-based intermediaries (Aernoudt et al., 2007). The government often supports these 
networks through tax concessions (e.g., the UK’s Enterprise Investment Scheme) and full or 
partial guarantees against risks, when the loss burden is shared with a public authority. This 
process of networking and government financial guarantees introduces potential multiple 
agency problems that likely reduce the extent of alignment of interests of BAs and minority 
public market investors (Arthurs et al., 2008).  
In contrast, the BA industry in France remains highly individualized and it is more 
likely to rely on the direct principal-agent relationship between angels and entrepreneurs 
(France Angels, 2004). This direct relationship may better enable BAs, in a country with 
weaker legal protection of minority shareholders, to monitor the behavior of management.  
Since these institutional differences between BA communities in the two countries will likely 
have relatively different importance in terms of mitigating post-IPO agency conflicts, we 
suggest:  
Hypothesis 3b:   Compared to French IPOs, UK IPOs will show a negative 
relationship between performance and BA retained ownership 
METHODS 
Sample 
 We followed a multi-stage data collection procedure as suggested by Nelson (2003). 
We include all IPOs that are floated on the main and secondary tier markets in each country. 
Our primary list of IPOs came from the London Stock Exchange New Issues files in UK and 
the Parisbourse S.A. in France. Further information was provided by the AIM Market 
Statistics publications for UK IPOs and the Autorités de Marchés Financiers (AMF) 
publications for French IPOs. The population of IPO firms over a specific period normally 
includes in addition to the flotation of entrepreneurial firms a wide diversity of organizations, 
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such as corporate spin-offs, equity carve-outs, reverse take-over vehicles, special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs), etc. Pooling all IPOs together creates a problem with comparability of these 
different organizational forms. For example, equity carve-outs and SPVs normally do not 
have private equity backing; plus, their promoters own a small fraction of the equity, which 
makes their comparison to other IPOs difficult. Following Nelson (2003), we focus on 
entrepreneurial IPOs to avoid this problem and obtain diverse patterns of block-holdings in an 
otherwise homogeneous sample of firms. From the original list of 966 IPOs over the period of 
1996-2002, we excluded re-admissions and transfers from AIM to the main market. We also 
excluded IPOs of unit and investment trusts, since they have very specific governance 
characteristics. Also excluded were IPOs from de-mergers, equity carve-outs, reverse 
takeovers, and equity reorganizations. The sample excluded investment and acquisition 
vehicles as their governance systems are extremely simplified, and their boards resemble 
investment committees of private equity firms. In addition we required that original founders 
retain equity stakes and board positions in the post-IPO firm in order to ensure that the firms’ 
governance was comparable.  After these selection steps, we obtained a sample of 444 IPOs 
for which we were able to identify the original founders. The variables of interest came from 
information provided in the IPO listing prospectuses, which contain detailed information on 
the pre- and post-IPO ownership of insiders and early stage investors.  
Lastly, since IPO firms’ characteristics usually help determine their performance, we 
attempted to capture risk differences between French and UK IPOs by matching firms based 
on their size, age, book-to-market ratio, and industry membership.  This method helps to 
ensure that as far as possible, the sample consists of firms that match in almost all major 
details except for the legal institutions that they face.  First, we used a matched pairs 
methodology where both French and UK IPO samples are matched as closely as possible by 
size and age, criteria usually used as control variables in the IPO literature (Chahine and 
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Filatotchev, 2008). Since continental VCs usually invest in larger and older ventures 
compared to their UK counterparts (Sapienza et al., 1996), the sample matching helps us 
avoid a possible selection bias in our sample. Ritter (1984) also shows that VC activity tends 
to be clustered by industry. We therefore matched our companies based on the hi-tech versus 
non hi-tech sector membership.3  However, different macroeconomic factors and business 
environments might shape IPO firms differently between the UK and France even when they 
are the same in terms of size, age, and industry membership. As a result we used the book-to-
market ratio to match our studied IPOs and control for growth opportunities (Fama and 
French, 1995). The result is a final sample of 224 IPOs (matched sample of 112 from each 
country).  
Measures 
Dependent Variables 
We used a combination of stock-market and operating performance of IPO firms. In 
line with Nelson (2003), the first measure was the percent price premium [(offer price – book 
value per share)/offer price], which assesses investor optimism about the future value of IPO 
firms. Nelson (2003: 715) argues that the percent price premium demonstrates the difference 
between the accounting and the market value and could measure “intangible assets, monopoly 
control, and investor enthusiasm, or some other factor that would dislocate stock price from 
accounting-based figures.”4 To examine operating performance, we used the return on assets 
(RoA), measured at the end of the IPO year. This measure takes into account the size of the 
firm and ensures that the relative asset intensity of various firms does not drive the results.   
                                                 
3 Although prior research uses SIC classifications, our results using hi-tech sector membership are consistent 
with Megginson and Weiss (1991) who use the three-digit SIC classification, and show concentration of VC-
backed IPOs in the high technology area. Using SIC classifications does not significantly affect our main 
conclusions but reduces the size of the sample to 43 IPOs in each country. 
4 To test whether our results are in line with findings by Arthurs et al. (2008) we also approximated the stock-
market performance of IPO firms by Underpricing or the percentage difference between the offer price and the 
price at the end of the first day of trading (i.e. [(end of the 1st day price)/(offer price) -1]. Although not presented 
here, the results are very similar to those obtained using Nelson’s measurement. Therefore, our findings are 
robust with regard to different specifications of IPO performance. 
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Independent Variables 
Ownership concentration (hypothesis 1a) was calculated as a Herfindhal-Hirschman 
index.  This index for each firm was based on the retained ownership of listed block-holders 
in the prospectus, which, apart from VCs and BAs also included founders, industry partners, 
non-founding directors, etc. The index is equal to the sum of the block-holders’ squared 
ownership as a percentage of the total post-IPO block-holding.   
We employed a variety of resources to identify the VC and BAs investors (hypotheses 
2a and 3a).  UK venture capital firms were identified from the British Venture Capital 
Association 2000/2001 Directory, 2000 Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Sources, and 
2000/2001 Venture Capital Report Guide to Venture Capital in the UK. We also included 
Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) managed by established venture capital firms.  VCTs are 
smaller, specialist funds normally set up for tax purposes by the larger players in the UK 
venture industry. We identified French Venture Capital firms from the Association Française 
des Investisseurs en Capital (AFIC) Directory. Unfortunately, similar information on 
members of BA networks in the UK and France is not available. BAs were identified through 
the prospectus as individuals that had invested in the venture as private individuals who are 
not associated with founders, other board members, senior managers, and venture capital 
investors. Both VC and BA ownership were calculated as percentages of the total number of 
shares outstanding after the IPO date.  
To address the possibility of the effects of institutional differences between the UK 
and French corporations in the sample, we use a dummy variable equal to 1 for the UK and 
zero otherwise. To test our counry-specific hypotheses 1b, 2b and 3b we adopted a 
methodology suggested by Kim, Hoskisson and Wan (2004) and used interactions between 
the UK dummy and three ownership variables (e.g., ownership concentration, VC retained 
ownership and BA retained ownership).  
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Controls 
We controlled for the IPO’s size (LogSize), measured as the logarithm of the firm’s 
capitalization at the offer price in pounds, and age, measured by the number of years between 
the firm’s founding date and its IPO date.   To control for the risk level of the IPO firm, we 
used a hi-tech dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was from the information technology and 
software sectors.   In addition, we included the sum of all risk factors mentioned in the IPO 
prospectus to control for the effect of risk on both market and operating performance; these 
risks factors included specific firm activities such as technology, competition, legal aspects, 
and exchange rate changes.  If the prospectus mentioned the risk it was assigned a 1, if not a 
zero with the total risk factors for the firm then totaled. 
IPO firms usually use diverse information to signal their value. Since governance 
parameters can serve as useful screening and sorting criteria that affect investors’ valuation of 
IPO firm (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Sanders and Boivie, 2004), we included board 
independence, i.e. the percentage of independent (external) directors on the IPO’s board. 
Signaling research also suggests that founders’ retained share ownership signals their private 
information on the higher quality of IPO firm and positively affects IPO value (Prasad, 
Vozikis, Bruton, and Merikas, 1995; Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Espenlaub and Tonks, 1998). 
Following these studies, we control for the effect of founder ownership on IPO firm 
performance. In addition, debt may limit managerial discretion and mitigates potential agency 
conflicts. To control for possible effects of debt on IPO valuations, we used the debt-to-asset 
ratio. Previous studies also control for effects of VC experience on IPO firm performance 
(Shepherd, Zacharakis, and Baron, 2002).  We use two VC characteristics as proxies for 
experience: fraction of global VCs in an IPO firm’s VC syndicate, and average age of VCs 
involved in the IPO firm.  
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Brav and Gompers (2003) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) suggest that high-quality 
IPO firms may signal quality by agreeing to longer lock-ups. Restricting the sale of stock for 
a longer period imposes costs on initial investors representing a credible signal of the firm’s 
quality. We included length of lock-up (in months) as a control variable.  
Previous empirical studies also control for the role of underwriter reputation. Using 
the cumulative market share over a five-year period prior to the IPO date as a proxy for 
underwriter reputation, we verify whether more prestigious underwriters have a third-party 
certifying role (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) or are more likely to seek their own advantage by 
charging lower fees and leaving more money on the table (Cooney et al., 2001). Gompers and 
Lerner (2000) show periods of high funds inflow can affect valuations. Accordingly, we also 
controlled for the bubble period of rapid growth through a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
IPO occurred during the  period 1999-2000, zero otherwise. Finally, as the period between 
IPO date and end of the IPO’s fiscal year varies across companies and may be important 
given the initial sensitivity of IPO firms to external environments (Certo, 2003), in the 
regression for operating performance we included a lag calculated as number of days between 
IPO date and end of fiscal year.  
Analysis 
Scholars modeling the relationships between risk financiers’ ownership and 
performance have generally employed standard OLS regression. However, involvement of 
different financiers in entrepreneurial firms is contingent on the risk characteristics of the 
venture (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989), such as founders’ ownership, experience, and board 
involvement (Filatotchev, Wright, and Arberk, 2006). Therefore, we have the potential risk of 
endogeneity as we analyze the private equity firms' retained ownership. For example, VCs’ 
investments might be driven by venture characteristics and their experience. Hence, 
performance is a function of endogenously related ownership variables, and a simple ordinary 
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least square regression may overestimate their explanatory roles (Hamilton and Nickerson, 
2003).  
Since both performance and ownership variables are continuous, a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression analysis was used to overcome the endogeneity problem. Within a 
2SLS regression predicted values for endogenous variables are generated at the first stage. At 
the second stage, these predicted variables were used as instrumental variables in OLS 
regressions to verify the hypothesized relationships. As the explanation of firm performance 
reflects a path model with multiple endogenous variables, we first implemented one 
regression for each endogenous variable (i.e., BA Ownership and VC Ownership), and then 
used their instruments to explain performance.   
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides correlations and descriptive statistics. The average price premium of 
72% suggests investors pay a significantly higher offer price than the book-value of equity, 
and are therefore optimistic about the prospects of newly listed firms. The average adjusted 
RoA is equal to 0.5%, suggesting that performance of IPO firms is not substantively different 
from its industry average. On average, BAs and VCs owned 4.3% and 8.3% of total equity in 
the IPO firm, respectively. This is significantly below founder ownership which is 39%. 
- Table 1 near here - 
Although not reported in Table 1, Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all studied variables 
are all below 1.65, which rejects serious multicollinearity concerns (O'Brien, 2007). 
Hypothesis Testing 
To address our concern related to the simultaneous determination of both BA and VC 
ownership variables, the empirical analysis begins by first determining the predicted values of 
VC and BA ownership variables, which are then used to verify our hypotheses in the 
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performance regressions. The analysis in Table 2 presents the first stage OLS regressions for 
both BA and VC ownership using the “Number of BAs” and the “Number of VCs” as 
instrument variables. Since BA ownership (VC ownership) naturally increases with the 
number of BAs (VCs), we believe both variables satisfy the necessary conditions for valid 
instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Murray, 2006). The correlation matrix (Table 1) 
indicates that correlations between the instruments and the dependent variables are not 
statistically significant, whereas the correlations between the instruments and the potentially 
endogenous explanatory variables (i.e. BA Ownership and VC Ownership) are strongly 
significant (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). To test the strength of our instruments, we 
calculated the partial R-square and the partial F-statistics. Our results indicate significantly 
high R-square for both the Number of BAs and the Number of VCs in Models (1) and (2), 
0.279 and 0.248 respectively. The F-statistics for the Number of BAs and the Number of VCs 
are equal to 15.85 and 13.84 respectively, which is greater than the required F-statistic of 10 
in Staiger and Stock (1997). This result confirms the strength of both variables as valid 
instruments for BA Ownership and VC Ownership.5 Both OLS regressions also controlled for 
the ownership concentration, firm-level demography factors, and for the lockup period 
following the IPO date. In addition, the VC ownership regression in Model (2) controls for 
the effects of the VC characteristics, i.e. the fraction of Global VCs, and average Age of VCs 
involved in the IPO firm.  
OLS regression results in Model (1) show that involvement of BAs in UK IPOs is 
significantly higher than in French IPOs (p≤0.001). These findings may be the result of the 
recent development of UK BAs’ networks which might have facilitated access by wealthy 
individual investors to young firms (Aernoudt et al, 2007). There is a positive association 
                                                 
5 Our results are also consistent with our test for the over-identifying restrictions which shows an insignificant 
Chi-square, thus confirming the instrumental variables to be well-identified. The C-Statistic test was also 
calculated for both instrumental variables, and the results confirm the orthogonality of both the Number of BAs 
and the Number of VCs. 
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between BA ownership and the ownership concentration variable (p≤0.10). Also, BA 
ownership is higher in hi-tech IPOs (p≤0.10), whereas it is negatively related to founder 
ownership (p≤0.10). In line with our expectations, BA ownership has a positive and 
significant relation to our selected instrument variable, i.e. the Number of BAs (p≤0.001). 
- Table 2 near here - 
Model (2) provides the results of the determinants of VC ownership. In contrast to the 
results in the BA regression, there is a higher VC ownership in French IPOs (p≤0.10). The 
negative association between VC ownership and ownership concentration (p≤0.05) suggests 
that VCs are less likely to participate in IPO firms with concentrated ownership, and that they 
are less likely to influence the management usually dominated by the founding team. This 
ownership pattern is also consistent with the negative association between VC ownership and 
Founder ownership (p≤0.001). As predicted, there is a significant association between VC 
ownership and the number of VCs (p≤0.001). Also, VC retained ownership increases in the 
percentage of Global VCs among the IPO owners (p≤0.05) as well as the average age of VC 
firms involved with the IPO firm (p≤0.001). This result suggests that more experienced VCs 
tend to retain a larger stake at IPOs.  
Table 3 provides results of the hypotheses tests. Models (3) and (4) present the OLS 
regression results, whereas Models (5),(6), and (7) include the 2SLS regression results 
controlling for potential endogeneity between VC and BA ownership by using the OLS 
regression results in Table 2 as a first stage.  
While Models (3) and (5) focus on the linear associations between price premium and 
ownership variables, Models (4) and (6) verify the moderating country effects on the 
interrelationships between ownership variables and IPO performance and analyze interactions 
between the UK dummy variable and the concentration, VC and BA ownership variables. 
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Consistent with hypothesis 1a, both Models (3) and (5) show a positive association 
between concentration and the price premium (at the p≤0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively). 
Moreover, both the OLS and 2SLS regressions results in Models (4) and (6) show a negative 
interaction term between concentration index and the UK dummy (p≤0.10). Consistent with 
hypothesis 1b, this suggests that compared to French IPOs, there is a negative relationship 
between performance and ownership concentration in UK IPOs. 
The OLS regression in Model (3) shows that the relationship between the price 
premium and VC retained ownership is insignificant. Controlling for potential endogeneity 
between VC and BA ownership variables, the 2SLS regression in Model (5) provides negative 
association between price premium and VC ownership (p≤0.10), in line with hypothesis 2a. 
Models (4) and (6) show a positive association between the price premium and the interaction 
of VC ownership and the UK dummy (p≤0.001). This finding is in line with hypothesis 1b 
and suggests that compared to French IPOs, price premium is positively related to venture 
capitalists’ retained ownership in UK IPOs.  
While the OLS regression in Model (3) does not show any significant association 
between price premium and BA ownership, the 2SLS regression in Model (5) indicates that 
price premium is positively related to BA ownership (p≤0.10). This finding is consistent with 
hypothesis 3a. Furthermore, both Models (4) and (6) show a negative association between 
price premium and the interaction term between BA ownership and the UK dummy (p≤0.001). 
This indicates that compared to French IPOs, price premium is negatively related to business 
angels’ retained ownership in UK IPOs, which is consistent with hypothesis 3b.  
- Table 3 near here - 
In terms of other controls, Table 3 indicates a higher price premium in UK IPOs. Price 
premium is also higher in larger IPOs but lower in older firms and in those with more 
independent boards. Price premium also increases in more levered IPOs and those managed 
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by more prestigious underwriters. As expected, IPOs in the bubble period have a higher price 
premium, whereas VC firms’ characteristics do not seem to affect price premium. 
Finally, Model (7) provides the 2SLS regression results for tests of effects of 
ownership structure on IPO performance using the adjusted return-on-asset (RoA) as a 
dependent variable. The regression results are generally consistent with the results in other 
models in Table 3, which suggests that the findings of the main study are supported by the use 
of a different dependent variable (operating performance). Concentration positively impacts 
the adjusted RoA, but compared to French IPOs, the adjusted RoA is negatively related to 
ownership concentration in UK IPOs. The adjusted RoA is negatively related to VC 
ownership, and this relationship is positively moderated by the UK dummy variable. 
Moreover, there is evidence of a country effect on the association between the adjusted RoA 
and BA ownership. Specifically, adjusted RoA is positively related to BA ownership, but 
compared to French IPOs, there is a negative association between adjusted RoA and BA 
ownership in UK IPOs (p≤0.10).  
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Governance research is growing in importance and the role of ownership effects is a 
central feature of such research. Most studies on the effects of ownership concentration on 
performance have examined mature companies and have used samples drawn from common 
law environments, especially North America. However, there is growing appreciation of the 
heterogeneity of governance mechanisms (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) and of how 
appropriate governance mechanisms may differ according to context (Lynall, Golden, and 
Hillman, 2003; Filatotchev and Wright, 2005). So far, researchers have neglected the 
implication of different firm and institutional contexts for relationships between ownership 
and firm performance.   
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This study extends the nascent theoretical emphasis on multiple agency theory.  We 
consider the heterogeneity of private equity investors looking at the impact of both formal 
(VC) investors and informal (BA) investors, such investors being cited by Jensen (1993) as 
the model for corporate governance. We show that their impacts on IPO firm performance are 
different, with BAs having a significant value-enhancing effect. This analysis allows us to 
bring into focus the multiple agency perspective and help expand understanding of this theory.  
Specifically, we highlight that VC and BA both focus on the pre-IPO firm seeking to add 
value to that firm.  However, post-IPO the VC focus shifts to those investors in their funds 
while the BA’s focus remains on the firm.  Second, we employ institutional theory to examine 
two different legal environments, which allow us to contrast corporate governance effects in 
common and French civil law countries. These two contributions advance our understanding 
of multiple agency theory and its perspective on corporate governance.  Further, we extend 
prior research by controlling for endogeneity of private equity firm ownership. 
In this context, our evidence on the differences in governance roles of different types 
of private equity investors is particularly important. This finding is in line with previous 
research on differences in the governance roles of various types of institutional block-holders 
(Hoskisson et al., 2002) and multiple agents (Arthurs et al. 2008), which we extend further by 
considering country effects. Our results show that VCs provide a negative effect on 
performance, and this finding is consistent with previous studies arguing that VCs may 
“grandstand,” i.e. take firms public in order to raise their profile in the market and attract 
capital in future rounds. However, VCs in the UK are significantly more likely to implement 
US-style post-IPO monitoring based on formal contractual terms including liquidation 
preferences, anti-dilution protections, vesting provisions and redemption rights, etc., as 
compared to their continental counterparts (Kaplan et al., 2007).  The positive effect of VCs 
on performance in the UK compared to France is one outcome of this monitoring. Similarly, 
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BAs seem to provide a positive effect on performance, but French IPOs drive this result. In 
France, strong networking and informal links between companies and investors may 
positively moderate this relationship between BAs and IPO firms.  
Future Research  
Our findings indicate a rich set of future research possibilities.  For example, the 
findings suggest that agency problems may vary across different national settings and implies 
that researchers should integrate the agency framework with institutional analysis to generate 
robust predictions.  Future research should expand on this concept and seek to more explicitly 
examine the nature of agency conflicts and their implications in different institutional settings 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003).  While we expect findings to be generalizable to other French 
civil law contexts like Spain and Italy (Hoskisson et al., 2004), would similar results be found 
in German civil law or the distinctive Scandinavian legal environments (Fiss and Zajac, 2004)?  
As investor protection in German civil law is less prevalent than in common law but more 
than in French civil law, the impact of German civil law may lie somewhere between the 
other two legal environments.   
This study also has limitations that suggest areas for further research. For example, we 
focused on the governance roles of ownership patterns and their impact on performance. 
However, other governance factors may also have importance that may differ from country to 
country. In our empirical analysis, we tried to verify country effects on the interrelationships 
between price premium and various governance parameters such as founder ownership, board 
independence, and VC firm age. We found that founder ownership in France positively 
affected price premium, but this association is weaker in the UK. Price premium appears 
negatively affected by board independence and VC firm age in France, but these effects are 
positive in the UK. This finding suggests that ownership concentration and the involvement of 
founders and business angels play more effective governance roles in France, whereas board 
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independence and VC involvement and experience provide stronger effects in the UK. 
Although comprehensive analysis of this complex interplay of various governance factors is 
beyond the scope of this paper, our results suggest that institutional differences between the 
UK and France significantly affect the roles played by different internal governance 
mechanisms. Fine-grained future research is needed to understand the interplay of these 
variables. 
Finally, our research highlights that rather than focus on agency as a singular concept 
there is a need to consider that agency is composed of different types of agency conflicts.  Our 
research employed the theoretical recognition of these different types of agency conflicts and 
highlights that they can result in different governance impacts by the different private equity 
investors.  Future research should build on this and seek to bring greater empirical support to 
this theoretical rational.  More specifically, multiple agency theory suggests that agency 
conflicts within the firm may vary according to different governance roles played by the 
corporate governance participants. A rich understanding of multiple agency theory will come 
when its component parts and their implications in different institutional settings are better 
understood.   
CONCLUSIONS 
Our research has provided a strong indication that ownership concentration and 
presence of private equity investors can be powerful tools in corporate governance.  However, 
it also demonstrates that ownership concentration is a tool of corporate governance whose 
impact differs based on the type of private equity investor.  These investors’ differential 
impacts depend on the institutional setting in which the relationships occur.  Similarly, 
different types of private equity investors can lead to contrasting performance outcomes, 
depending on the country of origin of the firm. Future research should build on these findings 
to better understand those settings and the performance benefit associated with block-holders. 
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 Table 1:  Descriptive statistics and correlations  
   Mean S.D.      1     2     3     4    5    6   7     8    9    10   11     12   13      
1.   (OP - BV)/OP  0.72 0.14                
2.   Adj RoA  0.01 0.10   0.03               
3.   UK dummy  0.50 0.50   0.15  -0.38              
4.   VC Ownership  0.08 0.14  -0.19  -0.18 -0.35            
5.   BA Ownership  0.04 0.09   0.03  -0.12  0.29 -0.06           
6.   Concentration Index 3021 1836   0.09   0.30 -0.34 -0.13 -0.22          
7.   Size (in Million) 27.87 23.59   0.13   0.02  0.04  0.07  0.07 -0.02         
8.   Age   9.31 9.40  -0.19   0.17 -0.05 -0.06  0.12  0.19 -0.06        
9.   Hi-tech dummy  0.68 0.47   0.09  -0.08 -0.07 -0.04  0.00 -0.03  0.17 -0.23       
10. Board Independence 0.39 0.21  -0.10  -0.08  0.12  0.21  0.17 -0.14 -0.02  0.03 -0.13      
11. Number of Risk Factors 6.13 5.35  -0.10  -0.04 -0.70  0.29 -0.20  0.20  0.04  0.02  0.13  -0.14     
12. Fin. Debt-to-Tot. Asset 0.12 0.16   0.10  -0.03 -0.09  0.02 -0.11 -0.07  0.02  0.08 -0.22   0.01  0.07    
13. Underwriter Reputation 0.02 0.04   0.15  -0.17 -0.28  0.26 -0.09  0.06  0.15 -0.10  0.12   0.11  0.28  0.05   
14. Lockup period (mths) 12.26 7.90  -0.06   0.04 -0.10 -0.11 -0.01  0.09 -0.15 -0.05 -0.12   0.04  0.03  0.09 -0.11  
15. Lag Period  175.1 95.3   0.02  -0.01 -0.04  0.09  0.02 -0.06 -0.04   0.01  0.00   0.06  0.02 -0.13   0.05  
16. Bubble period dummy 0.68 0.47   0.11   0.07  0.00  0.03  0.01 -0.16  0.01 -0.22  0.27  -0.02  0.07 -0.15   0.14  
17. Founder Ownership 0.39 0.25   0.18   0.21 -0.11 -0.29 -0.18  0.38 -0.02  0.08  0.00  -0.31  0.04 -0.07 -0.06  
18. Global VCs (Fraction) 0.48 0.40  -0.02  -0.09 -0.20  0.34 -0.09 -0.13 -0.01  0.01  0.02   0.12  0.21  0.01   0.19  
19. VC Firm Age (Average) 13.28 13.86   0.01  -0.08  0.02  0.29 -0.09 -0.18  0.13 -0.03 -0.11   0.08  0.04  0.03   0.08  
20. Number of BA  0.95 1.80   0.04  -0.06  0.08  0.00  0.67 -0.27  0.01 -0.01 -0.03   0.13 -0.05 -0.12   0.04  
21. Number of VC  1.25 2.46  -0.03  -0.05 -0.20  0.70 -0.04 -0.14  0.00 -0.03  0.05   0.18  0.35 -0.01   0.22  
 
Notes. 2-tailed Pearson correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficients above 0.125 and below -0.125 are significant at 0.05 level and higher.      
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      14             15     16     17      18      19      20   
1.   (OP - BV)/OP           
2.   Adj RoA           
3.   UK dummy           
4.   VC Ownership           
5.   BA Ownership           
6.   Concentration Index          
7.   Size (in Million)          
8.   Age            
9.   Hi-tech dummy           
10. Board Independence          
11. Number of Risk Factors          
12. Fin. Debt-to-Tot. Asset          
13. Underwriter Reputation          
14. Lockup period           
15. Lag Period   -0.01        
16. Bubble period dummy  -0.30   0.10       
17. Founder Ownership   0.07  -0.05  -0.10      
18. Global VCs (Fraction)  -0.20     0.11   0.11  -0.22     
19. VC Firm Age (Average)  -0.21   0.14   0.03  -0.22  0.40    
20. Number of BA   -0.03   0.03   0.05  -0.32  0.06  0.04   
21. Number of VC   -0.16   0.09   0.09  -0.29  0.31  0.26  0.01         
 
 
Table 2: Factors affecting VC and BA retained ownership 
 
             BA Ownership          VC Ownership  
      OLS      OLS 
       (1)       (2)   
Constant     -0.055†      0.045  
     (0.032)     (0.045)  
UK dummy      0.047***   -0.028† 
      (0.014)     (0.015)  
Concentration Index     0.119†    -0.009* 
      (0.066)     (0.004)  
Log Size       0.010      0.022† 
      (0.013)     (0.012)  
Age       0.001      0.001 
      (0.001)     (0.001)  
Hi-tech dummy      0.017†    -0.018† 
      (0.010)     (0.010)  
Board Independence     0.013      0.020 
      (0.019)     (0.035)  
Risk Factors      0.000     -0.001  
      (0.001)     (0.002)  
Financial Debt-to-Total Asset  -0.006    -0.009  
      (0.015)     (0.025)  
Lockup period      0.001    -0.001  
      (0.001)     (0.001)  
Founder Ownership   -0.050†    -0.202*** 
     (0.028)    (0.061) 
Global VCs         0.091* 
         (0.036) 
VC Firm Age         0.003*** 
         (0.001) 
Number of BA      0.031***   
      (0.006)    
Number of VC          0.029*** 
          (0.006)   
Partial R-squared     0.279       0.248 
Adjusted R-squared     0.523      0.687  
F-statistic      23.263      36.012  
Prob(F-statistic)     0.000      0.000   
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance (standard errors are in parentheses).  
***, **, *, †: statistically significant at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3: Factors affecting IPO firm performance 
                    (Offer Price – Book Value per Share) / Offer price              Adjusted RoA 
     OLS   OLS   2SLS   2SLS              2SLS 
       (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)  (7) 
Constant     0.603*** 0.665***  0.582***   0.592***            -0.04 
    (0.066)  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.065)                (0.048) 
Concentration Index    0.016*    0.001    0.017**    0.014†                0.043* 
    (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.008)             (0.021) 
Concentration Index x UK dummy   -0.018†    -0.017†                -0.047† 
      (0.010)    (0.010)                 (0.027) 
VC Ownership   -0.167  -0.275*  -0.172†  -0.231*                -0.26** 
    (0.126)  (0.110)  (0.088)  (0.114)              (0.094) 
VC Ownership x UK dummy      0.923***    0.809***              0.38** 
      (0.190)    (0.238)              (0.148) 
BA Ownership     0.157    0.665***   0.109†    0.521***             0.165† 
    (0.119)  (0.152)  (0.064)  (0.154)                  (0.092) 
BA Ownership x UK dummy    -0.614***   -0.674***            -0.149† 
      (0.181)    (0.162)                   (0.083) 
UK dummy     0.051†  -0.032    0.073**   0.055†                 -0.05** 
    (0.030)  (0.048)  (0.028)  (0.029)               (0.023) 
Log Size      0.025†    0.026†    0.026†    0.039*                 0.022† 
    (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.018)               (0.013) 
Age    -0.003**  -0.003*** -0.003**  -0.002**                0.005† 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)                  (0.003) 
Hi-tech dummy     0.016    0.017    0.020    0.020                   0.015 
    (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.022)               (0.02) 
Board Independence  -0.053†  -0.047†  -0.059†  -0.063†                 -0. 005 
    (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.035)  (0.037)                  (0.037) 
Number of Risk Factors  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002                  -0.003† 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)               (0.002) 
Financial Debt-to-Total Asset   0.148**   0.156***  0.144**   0.143**                0.02† 
    (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.048)               (0.011) 
Underwriter Reputation    0.634**   0.615**   0.615**   0.633**               -0.499* 
    (0.206)  (0.203)  (0.205)  (0.211)               (0.200) 
Bubble period dummy    0.023†   0.028†   0.024†   0.022†                  0.001 
    (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.013)               (0.001) 
Lockup period     0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000               0.000 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)               (0.001) 
Founder ownership     0.050   0.052   0.072   0.048               0.06† 
    (0.058)  (0.054)  (0.059)  (0.057)               (0.035) 
Global VCs (%)     0.026   0.010   0.012   0.010              -0.003 
    (0.049)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.046)               (0.027) 
VC Firm Age      0.001  -0.002   0.000   0.000               0.000 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)              (0.001) 
Lag period                        0.012† 
                        (0.07) 
Adjusted R-squared    0.315   0.326   0.301   0.323              0.343 
F-statistic     9.221  10.769   9.388   9.424              5.368 
Prob(F-statistic)     0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000              0.000 
 
Notes: Table 3 includes the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions of the (Offer 
Price –Book Value per Share)/Offer Price and RoA. Models  (3) and (4) present the OLS/2SLS regression results, and 
Models (5) and (6) present the 2SLS regression results of the factors affecting IPO firm pricing. Model (7) represents 2SLS 
regressions for RoA. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance (standard errors are in parentheses).
  
***, **, *, †: statistically significant at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
